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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through his
parents and natural guardians, Mary and Robert Doe,
             Appellant
v.
BELLEFONTE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cv-01463)
District Judge:  Honorable Malcolm Muir
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2004
Before:  RENDELL, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:   August 4, 2004)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background of this
case, we comment only regarding those facts that are pertinent to our disposition of this
2appeal.  John Doe (“Doe”) and his parents filed suit against the Bellefonte Area School
District (“the School District”) asserting a claim under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.  Doe appeals the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the School District asserting that the district court erred in concluding that no
reasonable fact-finder could find that the School District was deliberately indifferent to
the three (3) years of peer sexual harassment Doe encountered on account of his
effeminate characteristics.  Because we agree with the District Court that Doe failed to
adduce evidence to create a germane issue as to whether the actions taken by the School
District in response to the allegations were clearly unreasonable and therefore that the
School District could not have been found deliberately indifferent, we will affirm.
Doe contends that contrary to the district court’s holding, the School District’s
method of dealing with specific, identified perpetrators was not 100% effective in
stemming the harassment.  He suggests that the School District should have treated the
pattern of harassment as a systemic problem, and that its failure to do so met the
deliberate indifference standard.  He concludes that the School District’s response was
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstance that the harassment continued –
namely, each subsequent incident involved a student other than the student that had been
disciplined in any of the prior incidents of harassment directed at Doe.
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)
established a private right of action for student-on-student sexual harassment against
     1The sexual harassment complained of also must be so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim access to an educational
opportunity or benefit.  Id. at 651.  The district court’s holding that the harassment alleged
by Doe met this standard need not be addressed given our affirmance of the holding that
the School District was not deliberately indifferent.
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school districts under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended, 20
U.S.C. § 1681.  But the private right of action only lies where the school district is
deliberately indifferent to known acts of sexual harassment and the harasser is under the
school’s disciplinary authority.  Id. at 633.  Where a school district does not engage in
sexual harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate
indifference makes a student vulnerable to or causes them to undergo harassment.  Id. at
644-45.1  Deliberate indifference to acts of peer sexual harassment arises only where the
school district’s response or lack of response to the harassment is clearly unreasonable in
light of the known circumstances.  Id. at 648.
The relevant inquiry for purposes of evaluating whether the School District here
was deliberately indifferent to known circumstances of harassment is to review its
response to reported incidents of harassment.  Each and every time Doe complained, the
School District responded with reasonable actions which eliminated further harassment
between Doe and the student(s) involved in each incident.  Students were suspended and
others were given warnings and counseled regarding the seriousness of harassment.  In
addition, the School District circulated memoranda to faculty and staff putting them on
notice of the reported harassment of Doe and requesting assistance to prevent further
4incidents.  Doe was provided with a special means of reporting any additional harassment
through the school psychologist, whom he knew personally.  The School District also
held assemblies and enacted policies addressing peer-to-peer harassment.  Such actions
are not clearly unreasonable.
Nor was the School District deliberately indifferent because it did not undertake
the specific remedial action that Doe desired given what he perceived to be the “systemic
nature of the harassment.”  Davis does not require school districts to purge their schools
of actionable peer harassment or to engage in particular disciplinary action.  Id. at 648. 
We will refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by the School
District which effectively eliminated each reported source of harassment.  We do not
minimize the unfortunate verbal abuse that Doe was subjected to during his high school
years, but the School District was not deliberately indifferent because additional
harassment occurred under new and different circumstances.  We will affirm the
judgment of the district court.
